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Abstract 
In this paper we incorporate the efficiency wage theory in a general 
equilibrium model. In such a model wage rigidities resulting from the 
behaviour of rational agents can be endogenized, while at the same time 
general equilibrium effects can be taken into account. These wage 
rigidities can give rise to either unemployment or overemployment. We 
will give sufficiënt conditions for the existence of a quantity 
constrained equilibrium in a general equilibrium model with production. 
Furthermore, our model will be illustrated with a simple example. 
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1. Introduction 
Unemployment is nowadays one of the major issues of economics. Several 
theories have been developed explaining not only the existence of 
involuntary unemployment but also its form and persistence. By and 
large, there exist two sets of micro-theories which explain unemployment 
by explaining wage and price rigidities. On the one hand there are the 
so-called implicit contract theories and on the other hand there are the 
efficiency wage theories (see e.g. Stiglitz (1986)). 
Wage and price rigidities have already been recognized by Keynesian 
economists to account for unemployment, and this idea has been 
formalized in so-called disequilibrium models (see Malinvaud (1977)). 
One of the major drawbacks, however, of these disequilibrium models is 
that the rigidities are simply assumed. On the other hand, the modern 
micro-theories of unemployment are mostly of a partial equllibrium 
nature. 
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate the efficiency wage 
theory in a general equilibrium model. In such a model price rigidities 
resulting from the behaviour of rational agents can be endogenized, 
while at the same time general equilibrium effects can be taken into 
account. Furthermore, these price rigidities can give rise to rationing 
on the corresponding markets resulting in quantity constrained 
equilibria. 
The existence of quantity constrained equilibria in exchange 
economies with exogenous price rigidities has been proved by Benassy 
(1975) and Drèze (1975). Dehez and Drèze (1984) have investigated 
constrained equilibria in economies with production, again in the case 
of exogenous price rigidities. We will give sufficiënt conditions for 
the existence of a quantity constrained equilibrium in a general 
equilibrium model with production where rationing can occur on both 
sides of the market due to endogenous price rigidities. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
efficiency wage theory. In section 3 a general equilibrium model is 
presented of an economy with a constrained labour market resulting from 
an endogenously arising wage rigidity. In section 4 the existence of an 
equilibrium in the described economy is proved, while in section 5 a 
simple example is given to illustrate the model. Finally, section 6 
gives some concluding remarks. 
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2. Efficiency Wage Theory 
The basic hypothesis of the efficiency wage theory is that labour 
productivity is a function of the wage paid. Now, a rational profit 
maximizing firm may in the presence of unemployment choose to keep the 
wage above the market clearing, competitive level, because lowering the 
wage would result in a more than proportionate decrease in productivity. 
Up to now we referred to the wage not indicating whether we meant 
the nominal or the real wage. In a general equilibrium model without 
money there is no money illusion, i.e. only relative prices matter and 
it seems logical that we assume the productivity to depend upon the real 
wage. This means that not only the nominal wage enters the labour 
productivity function, but also prices of other commodities in the 
economy in the form of some price index. 
The efficiency wage theory can be formalized as follows. Let 
Q-* (Mpp/P) .L-J) be the production function of producer j, with pj, the 
nominal wage paid for one unit of labour L-l , P some price index and A 
some function of the real wage, taking values between zero and one, 
indicating the labour productivity of one unit of labour. Now, producer 
j maximizes his profits p • .Cp -p» .L-J over p. and L-* subject to his 
production function, with p. the price of one unit of the good produced 
by producer j. So his first order conditions are: 
p, . (3QJ/d(AlJ)) .iJ .A' .l/P = LJ 
and 
Pj.(3QJ/3(ALJ)).A = P i 
By dividing the second equation by the first we get A/A' = Pp/P-
Grafically this means that the producer chooses the wage at which the 
ray from the origin through the corresponding point on the labour 
productivity curve is tangent to this labour productivity curve (see 
also figure 1) . 
It must be noted, however, that this result is only valid when the 
producer is not rationed in his demand for labour. Although the 
efficiency wage theory seeks to provide an explanation for unemployment 
it cannot be ruled out beforehand that the resulting wage induces 
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overemployment. If this is indeed the case the producer will no longer 
set the real wage p»/P equal to A/A'. Taking account of a quantity 
constraint iP < Lmax, the first order conditions of the producer now 
become: 
p,.(5QJ/3(ALJ)).LJ.A'.l/P = lP 
and 
Pj.(dQJ/3(ALJ)).A = p^ + pj 
with /P the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint producer j faces. 
So, A/A' = (pn+/iJ)/P, Now, as /P>0 the optimal p»/P will be larger than 
(or equal to) the optimal p»/P in the unconstrained case (see figure 1). 
In other words, whenever the labour productivity maximizing wage is that 
low that the producer is rationed in hls demand for labour he will 
increase the real wage, relative to the optimal wage when no rationing 
occurs, in his own interest. Note that this does not mean that the real 
wage will be increased until the producer will no longer be rationed. 
Whenever the supply of labour is larger than the demand, i.e. the 
producers are not rationed in their demand for labour and all producers 
face the same labour productivity function, /P = 0 for all j and a 
uniform wage is set. However, when there is overemployment the producers 
will be rationed and in general the wages offered will differ from firm 
to firm depending upon the degree of rationing. In this case it will be 
necessary to make some additional assumptions with respect to the 
preferences of the consumers in order to be able to assign the labour-
supply of a specific consumer to a specific producer and thus to 
determine which consumer earns what wage. Possible assumptions to make 
are that all consumers are identical or that there is a continuüm of 
consumers. For the sake of simplicity and of clarity of the exposition, 
however, we will in the sequel assume that there is only one producer 
and that the consumers are uniformly rationed. 
3. Model 
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Let us consider a private ownership economy with 1 producer, m 
consumers, indexed by 1=1,...,m, and k commodities, indexed by 
h=l,...,k. Consumer i is characterized by a consumption set X1 C R ,, a 
utility function u1(x1) on X1, a vector of initial endowments w1 e R
 + 
and a share i5- c R+ in the profit made by the producer, where S-i9^  = 1. 
o (The inner product of two vectors a and b, a,b e R , is denoted by 
o 
a.b = 2/i ai^± an(i (a < b) l (c < d) means that a < b, c < d and 
(a-b).(c-d) = 0). 
The following assumptions are made on consumption. 
(A.l) X1, i=l,...,m, is a closed, convex subset of R
 +, containing 
{0}. 
(A.2) u1(x1) is a strictly quasi-concave function, i=l,...,m. 
(A.3) u1(x1) satisfies local nonsatiation, i.e. for all x1 6 Xx, for 
all e > 0, there is a consumption bundie x e X1 n BCx^e) such 
that u1(x1) < u1(x), i=l,...,m. 
(A.4) w1 > 0, i=l,...,m. 
The producer is characterized by a production possibilities set 
k k 
Y c R x R+, with R the space of production vectors, where inputs are 
measured negatively and outputs are measured positively, and R+ the 
space of wages. Note, that since the producer has one choice variable 
more than the consumers, i.e. the wage, the production possibilities set 
Y is of higher dimension than the consumption sets X of the consumers. 
The following assumptions are made on production. 
(A.5) Y is a closed and strict convex subset of R x R+ and contains 
(0). 
(A.6) The free disposal assumption holds, i.e. Y - (R
 + x {0}) c Y. 
(A.7) There is no free production, i.e. Y n (Rk+ x {0)) = {0}. 
Now, let us assume that the producer produces a single output Q, using 
k-1 inputs (k>l), one of these inputs being labour, denoted by L, the 
other inputs being represented by a (k-2)-vector K. Now, with the 
production function given by Q = Q(A(pp/P(p)).L,K) we have that Y = 
{(Q,K,L)Pi) | Q < Q(X(Pi/P(p)).L,K), p i e R + I L e R. , K e R k " 2 . ) . The 
producer is price setter on the labour market, while all other markets 
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are competitive. Note, that as inputs are measured negatively we have 
that LeR_ and KeR " _. The market price of the output, of labour and the 
vector of market prices of the other k-2 inputs are denoted respectively 
by p° e R+, p^ e R+ and p1 e Rk~2+ and let p=(p°,plT)T. Let (l,s) be a 
uniform rationing scheme, with |l| (1<0) the maximum labour input of the 
producer and s (>0) the maximum labour supply of a consumer. 
The producer maximizes his profit, p . Q - p ^ . L - p .K, subject to 
his production function, which is given by Q = Q(A(pn/P(p)).L,K), and 
the quantity constraint L > 1, where pp is the wage paid for one unit of 
labour and P(p) is a price index, which is homogeneous of degree one in 
p. A is some continuous function of the real wage pp/P(p) taking values 
between zero and one, indicating the productivity of one unit of labour. 
k-2 The m consumers have initial endowments Q^ e R+, K^ e R + and 
L* G R+, i=l,..,m and maximize their utility function UX(QJ ,K^, . . . , 
K- i-.O'—i'^O subject to their budget constraints and the quantity 
constraint L- < s, with Q- and K-- the demand by consumer i for the 
output Q respectively input j, j=l,...,k-2, and L^  the labour supply of 
consumer i. The fi.nal assumption we make on production is the following. 
(A.8) The production function Q(A(p^/P(p)).L,K) and the labour 
productivity function A(pfl/P(p)) are continuously differentiable 
functions. 
As the producer is a wage setter, the labour market does not 
necessarily clear. The real wage follows from the profit maximization 
problem of the producer. The real wage is determined by the equation 
(p^ +yu)/P(p) = A(p^/P(p))/A'(p^/PCp)) (see also section 2). Note, that 
the nominal wage can be derived from the profit maximizing real wage for 
given prices of the other commodities. In other words the profit 
maximizing nominal wage is a function of all the other prices, i.e. 
Pi = P_j>(p)- This relationship between nominal wage and other prices 
induces general equilibrium effects the model can take account of. If 
for example due to some tax reform, prices of other commodities in the 
economy change, the nominal wage will as a consequence also change and 
consequently the level of rationing on the labour market will change. 
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Definition 3.1 
An efficiency wage equilibrium is a set of consumption plans x1 = 
(Qix,Ki ,Li-Lix),i=l m, a production plan y = (CT,K\l/) , a vector 
of prices (p ,p ,p^ ), and a (uniform) rationing scheme (1 ,s ) such 
that: 
(i) x maximizes u (Q^ ,K^ ,L^-L^) «-= u (x ) on X subject to p .K^ + 
Pi (il-1!) + P Qi - P Qi + P •% + Pi k + *i-*(P ) a n d 
Lj* < s*, i-l,...,m, with TT(P*) - (p0*,?1*7,?/). (Q*,K*T,L*)T. 
(ii) (y ,pj> ) maximizes profit (p ,p ,p^) .y on Y subject to 
Q - Q(A(Pi/P(p*)).L,K) and L* > 1*. 
(iii) ( 2 ^ * < Q* + 2 ^ ) l (p°* > 0). 
(iv) ( S ^ * - K*h < 2 ^ ) 1 (P I\ ^  0), h=l,...,k-2. 
(v) -L* = SJLJ*. 
(vi) if for some i: L- = s then L > 1 and if L = 1 " then L-" < s" 
for all i. 
So at an efficiency wage equilibrium consumers maximize their 
utility, the producer maximizes profits over inputs and wage, exchange 
is voluntarily, agents at the short side of the market realize their 
plans and actually bought and sold amounts of goods are equal. 
4. Existence of equilibrium 
In this section we will prove the existence of an efficiency wage 
equilibrium. Following Debreu (1959) we define the set of attainable 
states A - {(x^.y.Pjg | E ^ 1 - y < w, p^ < E ƒ Up, x1 e X1, (y.p^ 6 Y} , 
with x1 - (Qi,Kil K± k_2,±i-~Li)' y = (Q'K1 Kk.2'L)> w " (SiÖi-
' A . A 
2-K-,E^L.) and EpSU^ some number larger than zero. Let X1 and Y be 
the projections of A respectively on X1 and Y and let X1 = F n X1 and 
Y = G n Y, with F and G compact convex sets containing respectively 
A - A 
X1 and Y in their interiors. Now, as the production function is 
continuously differentiable, 3Q/3(AL) has a maximum value on the compact 
set Y. We will call this maximum value Qpmali. For the existence proof 
it will be necessary that E;maX ^ BpSUP- It can easily be seen that we 
can always find a EpSU^ such that the corresponding EpmaX satisfies 
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Ei max < Pp
SUP. The strict convexity of the production possibilities set 
requires a strict concave production function and consequently 
32Q/3(AL)api = 32Q/(3(AL))2.L.aA/api < 0, in other words 3Q/3(AL) must 
be non-increasing in p^ ,. So for increasing £^SUP, E^maX will be non-
SUP
 W P « m finH n.max < n,suP. Since increasing and for large enough p_p v we will find Ep < Ej> 
the demand and supply functions which follow from the utility 
maximization problems of the consumers respectively the profit 
maximization problem of the producer are homogeneous of degree one in 
the prices, we have one degree of freedom. We will use this degree of 
freedom to normalize the prices of the output good of the producer and 
of the k-2 inputs other than labour as to sum to one. 
We define the set T = {qeSk~2, reR+! U£eR+ | 0 < r < 2p.imax> 
.k-2 0 < Ej> < E^ } > with S the (k-2)-dimensional unit simplex given by 
Sk~2 = {q e Rk_1+ | Si q^ - 1). On T we define the functions p(q,r,p_^), 
l(q,r,E^) and sCq.r.Ep by: 
pi(q,r,E/e) = q^_ for i-l,...,k-l 
E^ for i=k, 
K q j . E p 
-maxtO.minll^-r/E^}] • (SL^l) if
 E^ > 0 
0 if E^ = 0 
s(q,r,E|) mind.r/E^J.CSLi+l) 
SLi+l 
if Ei > 0 
if E^ = 0 
en No te that when r < E^ then l(q,r,E^) = -(2L^+1), when r > Ej> tn 
s(q,r,Ei) = (SL^+1) and r > 2E^ implies l(q,r,Ej>) = 0 (see also figure 
2). Furthermore, p (q.r.Ep •= p1(q,r,E^) and p (q,r,Ep = (P2(q.r>£i)> 
•••-Pk.lCq.r.Ei))1. 
Let the function z : Sk x R+ x R+ •+ R be given by: 
z(q>r,Ei) 
' Six1(q,r,Ei)-y(q,r,Ei)-w ' 
. P^Cq.r.E^) - V-z 
f S i Q i - Q - E i Q i ] 
SiKi " K " ^ i 
2iLi 
. Pi(q.r,Ei) " Ei . 
?ith x 1 ( q , r , £ ^ ) = {argmax u 1 ( x 1 ) | x1eX1 , 
, r , E i ) Q i + p I ( q , r , p _ i ) . K i + p^ 
P 1 ( q , r , 2 / e ) •Ki + p ^ q . r , ^ ) ! ^ + •di.n(q,r,E.£) , L i < s ( q , r , £ ^ ) 
P°(q Ei)Q  r,p K  k(q,r,£i)(Li-Li) < p°(q,r1pi)Qi + 
and (yCq.r,^) .p^Cq.r,^)) = {argmax (p (q,r,p.i),(p (q, r ,p_p ) T .p^) .y | 
(ylPi)eY,L > l(qir,Ei)}. 
Now, p(q,r,p.^), s(q,r,p_^ ) and l(q,r,E^) are continuous in (q,r,p_^). From 
the continuity of l(q,r,D^) it follows that the correspondence on T 
defined by {(y,pj>)e? | L>l(q,r ,p_j,)} is continuous on T. So, since Y is 
strictly convex, (y(q,r ,Q£) ,p^(q,r ,pn)) is a continuous function on T. 
Furthermore, jr(q,r,p_p = (p (q,r,pi),(p (q,r ,££) )T,P/g(q, r ,££) )T,y(q ,r ,p_p 
is a continuous function. Finally, as the budget correspondences of the 
consumers are continuous in p, n and s (see Drèze (1975)) and p(q,r,p_n), 
^(q, i",p_p) and s(q,r,pn) are continuous on T, the budget correspondences 
are also continuous on T and consequently, using the strict quasi-
concavity of u (x ) , we can derive that x (q,r,p_j>) is a continuous 
function on T. Now, z(q,r,p_n) is a continuous function on T, by the 
continuity of x1(q,r,pi), y(q,r,p_|) and p^q.r.E^). 
Lemma 4.1 
pi(q,r,E(g) * Ejemax 
Proof 
In section 2 we have seen that the producer sets a wage Pp°^ with 
A/A' = Vp0^ if ne is not rationed. From the first order conditions of 
the maximization problem of the producer we have that pn°^ must satisfy 
the equation p^°^ = p.3Q/3(AL).A. So, as p<l and A<1 we have that 
Pj,°P < 3Q/3(AL) < p_^max. If the producer is rationed the wage set must 
satisfy the equation p.3Q/3(AL).A = pp + y., with n the Lagrange 
multiplier of the constraint L > l(q,r,p_p. But then also P
-
f°pt ^  Êf>maX 
as n > 0. 
D 
It can easily be seen that the following theorem holds. 
Theorem 4.2 
2i=lPi^>r'Ei) •zi(q,r,pi) = (p^q.r.p^) - Ep.L 
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Theorem 4.3 
Under Assumptions (A.1) to (A.8) there exists an efficiency wage 
equilibrium. 
Proof 
Define the function f:Sk"2 x [0,2B/1**] x [0)E/gmax] - Sk~2 x [0,2Eimax] 
x [0,E/ax] by: 
fh(q,r,uji) = (qh+max[0,zh(q,r,t2i)])/(l+Ek;l]; max[0 , z^  (q, r ,p_i) ]) 
h-l,...,k-l 
^(q.r.E^) = max[0,min(2t2_£max,r+zk(q,r,£i))] 
Now, according to Brouwer's theorem f has a fixed point (q" ,r",E/)-
So, f(q ,r ,££ ) = (q ,r ,£i ) . 
At (q" , r , E / ) w e have: 
( i ) f k + 1 ( q * , r x , E / ' c ) = E / 
Now, e i t h e r E^ " ° . E / = E / & X o r V.f = E/ + 
2 k + l ^ > r * > E i * ) -
In the latter case we have that Zic+^ (q",r ,E^ ) = 0 straight 
away. 
If 2j = 0 then Ej> + zk+l^ 'r 'Ei ^ - ^ anc^ consequently 
zk+1(q" ,r" ,E_f ) ^  0. On the other hand zk+1(q", r" ,E^") = 
P^(q .r ,E,f ) • Ei ^ °- So> zk+l(cl 'r 'Ei ^ = °-
F i n a l l y , i f
 E / = E / * * then E / a x < E / + 2 k + l ^ " ' r * ' E / ) • 
So, zk+1(q>>>r>s>E^ ) ^ 0. On the o ther hand, z k + 1 (q / < , r" , E / ) 
= Pi (q . r >E| ) - Ei = P^(q >r .Ei ) " Ei ^ 0. 
So, z k + 1 (q^, r> < ' ,Ei ) = °-
( i i ) f k (q , r , E ^ ) = r 
Now, either r = 0, r = 2 E / or r - r + zk(q ,r ,Ei ). 
In the latter case we have again straight away that 
zic^ 'r 'Ei") = 0-
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If r = 0 we must have that r +Zjc(q,r,E/£ "):<()• But then 
also zk(q >r , Ep ) - 0- But on the other hand, r" = 0 
"k "k "k 
implies s(q ,r ,Eo ) = 0. So, Lj= 0 and consequently, 
Zv(q",r",2» ) = -L > 0. But then we must have zk(q" , r" ,p_n") 
= 0. 
If r* - 2 E / a x then 2 E i m a x < r* + zk(q*, r*lE/) • So, 
~k k k k k ~k 
zk(q , r ,2» ) > 0. On the other hand, l(q ,r ,£_g ) = 0 and 
consequently L = 0 and zk(q ,r ,£« ) < 0. 
So, z^ (q ,r ,j>g ) - 0 must hold. 
(iii) fh(q ,r .^ ) = qh , h=l k-1 
Now, Zj1(q",r ,Ej> ) < 0 holds for h=l,...,k-l. 
Suppose, ^(q ,r ,E^ ) > 0 for some h, h=l,...,k-l. Then 
S^max[0,z-(q ,r ,£^ ) ]. > 0. But then z^(q", r" ,Ej>") > 0 for 
all h=l,...,k-l with q,' - Pn^ ,r '2-2 ) > 0. &ut as 
zk+l^" ,r" ,Ei"^ = ° a n d consequently p^ (q" , r" ,-Q_^ ) = E|" 
this cannot be the case, as according to theorem 4.2 
_ k . * * *. . -k -k -k. , . -k -k k k 
Zi=l Pi(q 'r ,Ei )>zi(cl ,r '^ i ) = (Pi(q >r .Ei )"Pi ) - L 
= 0 and zk(q*,r*,Ei*) = 0 and p* = (p-^ Pk-1*)T e sk"2' 
So Zi (q"., r" ,Ej> ) ^  0 for all h must hold. 
Finally, it can easily be seen that a vector (q" >r",pp"), for which 
zh(q ,r ,E^ ) < 0 for h=l,...,k-l, zk(q ,r .E^ ) = zk+l^ -r >Ei ) = 
0 holds, induces an efficiency wage equilibrium. Firstly, using a 
Standard argument (see Debreu (1959)) one shows that conditions (i) and 
(ii) of definition 3.1 are actually satisfied. Furthermore, it is 
straightforward that conditions (iii), (iv) and (v) are satisfied. 
Finally, from the definitions of l(q ,r,pn) and s(q ,r,pp) it is 
immediately clear that also condition (vi) is satisfied, as for all i we 
have Li < h±. So, -L* = S ^ * < SiLi < SiLi + 1 or L* > - ( 2 ^ + 1) and 
L^ < Lj_ < ^ iLi + 1- In other words, whenever L-" = s(q" ,r",p_^"), it 
•£ St~T St "st 
must be the case t h a t r < Ej> > ^>ut then l ( q , r ,£^ ) «= - (S^L^ + 1) and 
St St"T St st St *ït~r St St 
consequent ly L > l ( q , r , E ^ ) and i f L = l ( q , r ,Ej> ) , i t must be 
•^ st~r i t St 
the case t h a t r > ^ , but then s(q , r ,p_^ ) = s i L i + 1 a n d 
St St T St St 
consequently L^ < s(q ,r ,p_n ). 
D 
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5. An Example 
In this section we will give a simple example to illustrate our model. 
The construction of the existence proof given in section 4 allows for a 
direct application of a simplicial (fixed point) algorithm which 
k 2 2 
operates in S x R
 + (for a detailed description of such an algorithm 
see Hofkes (1990)) to actually compute an equilibriunt of the described 
economy. It must be noted that, although the assumption of convexity of 
the production possibilities set (A.5) implicitly gives restrictions on 
A, in practise a labour productivity function of the form as given in 
figure 1, i.e. of the form X = (l/(l+exp( (-p,,/P(p) )/c+a)) -
l/(l+exp(a))}.{(l+exp(a))/exp(a)} can be used , since the algorithm 
always finds an equilibrium in the convex part of A, i.e. for a value of 
Pj, larger than or equal to the value of pp given by A/A' = p ^. 
Let us assume that we have an economy with one producer and two 
consumers. The producer has a Cobb Douglas production function given by 
Q = K1/4 L1/2^1/2, with A = {l/(l+exp(-pi/c+3))-l/(l+exp(3))} . 
((l+exp(3))/exp(3) } , so P(p) is taken to be identical to 1. The 
consumers have a Cobb Douglas utility function given by 
u-Q1/3.Kl/3>(L . L)l/3_ 
Now, equilibria have been computed for various values of c and 
various initial endowments of the consumers (see table 1) . It appears 
that for a low value of c (c=0.05) the producer is rationed in his 
demand for labour (p>0) and the wage offered is indeed larger than the 
optimal wage in case he would not be rationed ( i.e. the wage given by 
A/A' = p^, i.e. pp •= 0.21, see also figure 3). For higher values of c 
(e.g. c = 0.5) the producer is not rationed and the labour productivity 
maximizing wage given by A/A' = pp is set (see figure 4). Now, the 
consumers are rationed in their supply of labour and unemployment 
occurs. 
Note, that for low values of c the labour productivity is larger 
for a given value of pp than for higher values of c. The parameter c can 
be seen as an indicator of working conditions. When c is small, working 
conditions are good and low wages induce a high labour productivity. 
When c is large, working conditions are not so good and wages have to be 
higher to induce a high labour productivity. 
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Table 1. equilibrium prices 
ö l Kl ^1 02 K2 L2 *1 *2 c P Pk Pi V 
3 5 8 4 3 8 0.75 0.25 0.05 0.53 0.47 0.23 0.05 
3 5 8 4 3 8 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.53 0.47 2.13. 0 
3 5 8 4 3 8 0.75 0.25 1 0.53 0.47 4.26 0 
25 17 12 20 10 12 0.75 0.2.5 0.1 0.37 0.63 0.57 0.98 
25 17 12 20 10 12 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.37 0.63 2.13 0 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have incorporated the efficiency wage theory in a 
general equilibrium framework. In our model a wage rigidity arises 
endogenously from the profit maximizing behaviour of the producer by 
incorporating a labour productivity function in the production function. 
The existence of a quantity constrained equilibrium is proved and a 
simple example is given. This example illustrates that the model not 
only covers the case of unemployment, i.e. the case where consumers are 
rationed in their supply of labour, but also the case of overemployment. 
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Figure 1. the labour productivitv function 
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Figure 3. the labour productivitv function: c - 0.05 
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